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Last June, the headlines said that the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Windsor' struck down the Defense of Marriage
Act.2 But that is only half true. The Defense of Marriage Act had two
important provisions. Section Three defined "marriage" for purpos-
es of federal law as being limited to the union of one man and one
woman. 3 It was invalidated in Windsor. But the Act's other section,
Section Two, says that states are not required to recognize one an-
Neubauer Family Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School
(starting January 1, 2014). Thanks to Sam Bray, Chad Flanders, Randy Kozel, Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Steve Sachs, and James Stem for comments on a draft.
1 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675,2682 (2013).
2 See, e.g., Eyder Peralta, Court Overturns DOA4, Sidesteps Broad Gay Marriage Rul-
ing, NPR NEWS (June 26, 2013, 1:05 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2013/06/26/195857796/ supreme-court-strikes-down-defense-of-marriage-act;
Megan Slack, Supreme Court Strikes Down Defense of Marriage Act, WHITE HOUSE
BLOG (une 26, 2013, 2:30 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/06/26/
supreme-court-strikes-down-defense-marriage-act.
3 Defense of Marriage Act, ch. 3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996), codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7.
150
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other's same-sex marriages. 4 Section Two was not invalidated, but it
may be soon.
Indeed, the validity of Section Two is a natural question after
Windsor. Putting it more generally, the question is whether states
are constitutionally required to recognize same-sex marriages that
were celebrated elsewhere.
One federal court has already answered "yes," relying on Wind-
sor to hold that interstate recognition is constitutionally required. In
Obergefell v. Kasich, a federal district judge granted a temporary re-
straining order requiring the state of Ohio to recognize a marriage
between two Ohio men who had briefly traveled to Maryland to
marry.5 There is more to come: It seems likely that the court will
issue a final decision soon enough, and another plaintiff has already
been added to the Obergefell suit.6 Many other courts will soon con-
front the same question. 7
Windsor does not address this question directly. The decision
contains two different strands of reasoning, one of which supports
interstate recognition, and one of which does not. It is not obvious
which of these strands is supposed to control or how to reconcile
them. I offer one theory for reconciling them, under which many
same-sex couples would have a right to have their marriages recog-
nized. Nonetheless, I argue, the district court's order in Obergefell
went too far.
4 Defense of Marriage Act, ch. 2, 110 Stat. 2419, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C
(1996). Section One was the title.
- Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, Obergefell
v. Kasich, No. 13-501 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 2013), available at http://sblog.s3
.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Judge-Black-ruling-on-marriage-7-
22.pdf. The recognition was for the sad occasion of issuing a death certificate.
6 Amended Complaint, Obergefell v. Kasich, No. 13-501 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 3,2013).
7 See, e.g., Complaint, Palladino v. Corbett, No. 13-5641 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 26, 2013).
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I. BEFORE WINDSOR
Under current doctrine, states are not constitutionally required
to recognize one another's marriages. That is, when a couple gets
married in State A but lives in State B (either during the marriage or
later on), State B has the power to treat the couple as unmarried.
Most of the time, the issue does not arise. States usually choose to
recognize one another's marriages out of comity, though they re-
serve the right to refuse when they have a strong "public policy"
against that type of marriage. Many states have adopted so-called
"mini-DOMAs" which express a strong public policy against the
recognition of same-sex marriages from other states. 8
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution 9 does little
to force states to recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages. The
Clause empowers "Congress" to decide what "effect" public acts
shall be given, and in Section Two of DOMA, Congress has provid-
ed that states do not have to recognize same-sex marriages from
other states. Section Two of DOMA was probably unnecessary, be-
cause even without the statutory exception, states have traditionally
not been required to implement legislative rights (as opposed to
judicial judgments) from other states that they find objectionable. 10
Before Windsor, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
had not been held to stop this either. Section Two of DOMA was
controversial because some thought it to be problematic under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause. Others thought it to be mostly redun-
8 ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES
CROSS STATE LINES 137-141 (2006).
9 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State; And the Con-
gress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.").
10 See William Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes, 64
STAN. L. REv. 1371, 1390-93 (2012).
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dant with the longstanding state power to decline to recognize for-
eign marriages. Constitutional challenges were not common, and
not successful. In Wilson v. Ake, for example, a federal district court
rejected due process and equal protection claims by a couple seek-
ing to have their Massachusetts marriage recognized in Florida." A
few years later, a Texas appellate court rejected* a constitutional
challenge to its anti-recognition law. 12 After Windsor, however,
plaintiffs are likely to argue that all of that has changed.
II. WINDSOR
The Supreme Court's decision in Windsor does not directly ad-
dress the interstate recognition question. About Section 2 of DOMA,
the Court noted only that it "has not been challenged here." 13 To be
sure, the facts of the case did present a potential recognition ques-
tion-Ms. Windsor and Ms. Spyer had been married in Canada in
2007 at a time when New York did not allow same-sex marriage.
But the Court was apparently satisfied with the fact that New York
(where the couple lived during and after the marriage) "deems their
Ontario marriage to be a valid one." 14 The Court did not say what
would have happened if New York had not deemed the marriage
valid.
11 Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
12 In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 681 (Tex. App. 2010) (review
granted Aug. 23, 2013).
13 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682.
14 Id. at 2683 (citing Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 177-78 (2d Cir. 2012)).
It is not 100% clear, though it is likely, that New York law recognized a foreign same-
sex marriage at the time, Brief of States of New York, et al., United States v. Windsor,
2013 WL 840031, at 26-27 & n.10, and it is not at all clear whether the marriage would
need to be recognized by New York to be valid for federal purposes, Baude, supra
note 10, at 1392-98. Perhaps the Court did not elaborate because it was sensitive to
the difficulty of the issue.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty
2013]
154 New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 8:150
It is difficult to tell what Windsor says indirectly, because it is
not framed in a way that easily tracks existing doctrine. It declines
to pick a "level of scrutiny" for discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation and does not even clarify whether the decision is ulti-
mately rooted in "equal protection" principles or in so-called "sub-
stantive due process" principles.1 5 But taking the decision on its
own terms, Windsor uses two lines of reasoning in invalidating Sec-
tion 3 of DOMA, one of which provides some support for a right to
interstate recognition, and one of which does not -and may even
cut against it.
The latter line of reasoning is the opinion's much-debated refer-
ences to federalism. Over the course of several paragraphs, the
Court observes that "by history and tradition the definition and
regulation of marriage ... has been treated as being within the au-
thority and realm of the separate States." 16 It says that "'regulation
of domestic relations' is 'an area that has long been regarded as a
virtually exclusive province of the States,'" and that this authority
includes "the recognition of civil marriages," 17 and so on.
The federalism theme does not support a right to interstate
recognition. Recognizing the traditional role of states in defining
and recognizing marriage says very little about which state's defini-
tion ought to control when two states are in conflict. Moreover,
Windsor approvingly quotes Williams v. North Carolina's statement
that "each state as a sovereign has a rightful and legitimate concern
in the marital status of persons domiciled within its borders." 18 This
would suggest that when a couple becomes domiciled in a new
state, that new state has a "rightful and legitimate concern" in de-
ciding whether to recognize their marriage.
15 See generally Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2705-2707 (noting these ambiguities).
16 Id. at 2689-2690.
17 Id. at 2691 (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,404 (1975)).
18 Id. (quoting Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942)).
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Yet the opinion in Windsor contains a second theme as well,
holding that "the State's power in defining the marital relation is of
central relevance in this case quite apart from principles of federal-
ism." 19 The idea is that a state law recognizing or creating a mar-
riage also creates a constitutional liberty interest. As the Court puts
it, "the State's decision to give this class of persons the right to mar-
ry conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import."20
The theme is repeated: The state-law marriage "enhanced the
recognition, dignity, and protection of the class in their own com-
munity" and gave the couple's "lawful conduct a lawful status.., a
far-reaching legal acknowledgment of the intimate relationship be-
tween two people, a relationship deemed by the State worthy of
dignity in the community equal with all other marriages."2' By do-
ing so, "the state has sought to dignify" the marriage and has
"sought to protect in personhood and dignity" the couple. 22
As a matter of doctrine, the connection of the liberty interest to
state law is a little confusing. The Court's so-called "procedural due
process" cases have sometimes said that a "liberty interest" can be
created by state law, as in the case of state innocence procedures, 23
good-time credits,24 conditional parole,25 restricted sentencing dis-
cretion,26 or involuntary transfer from prison to a mental hospital. 27
But Windsor does not appear to have been a procedural due process
case.
19 Id. at 2692 (emphasis added).
20ld.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 2694-96.
23 See Dist. Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 67-68
(2009).
24 See Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 495 (1985); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557
(1974).
25 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480-82 (1972).
26 See Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343,346 (1980).
27 See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480,487-88 (1980).
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By contrast, the Court's "substantive due process" cases have
tended to ask whether a liberty was fundamental in a historical or
emerging sense. This inquiry does not look to a specific state's
law. 28 Nor do the Court's equal protection cases normally ask the
federal government to defer to the choices made by a state's law.
However, one can articulate reasons that state law might be rele-
vant to the equal protection claim. In particular, the Court suggest-
ed that DOMA was constitutionally suspicious because the federal
government usually defers to state marital classifications but did
not do so here.29 Hence, the argument goes, the unusual treatment
can be explained only by hostility to that class of marriages.
In any event, the same ideas - that marriage is a state-created
liberty, and that once it is created, it is entitled to equal treatment -
can be used to argue for an interstate recognition right. States are
bound by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause just as
the federal government is bound by the Fifth Amendment's. If the
important part of Windsor is the state's decision to "confer[] ... a
dignity and status of immense import," one might say that states,
like the federal government, cannot disfavor that status and dignity
once it has been granted.
III. AFTER WINDSOR
Applying Windsor is in part a question of how to reconcile these
two elements of Windsor's holding -or which of them to privilege.
28 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (noting that the
Court looks to "Our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices...."); Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-72 (2003) ("[W]e think that our laws and traditions in the
past half century are of most relevance here.").
29 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 ("DOMA, because of its reach and extent, departs
from [the] history and tradition of reliance on state law to define marriage."); see also
Baude, supra note 10, at 1378-80 (anticipating these arguments).
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If the language about state-conferred status and dignity is para-
mount, then a court faithfully applying the logic of Windsor should
say that states must recognize same-sex marriages celebrated under
another state's law. If the language about the federal government's
limited role is paramount, then courts should leave the current law
of recognition alone.30
So what is the effect of Windsor on interstate recognition? Per-
haps the most honest answer is that while it is not binding authori-
ty, it is nonetheless a form of persuasive authority. 31 This means
that there is a much better argument for requiring interstate recogni-
tion of same-sex marriage after Windsor than there was before it.
But the decision in Windsor cannot do all of the work. As Professor
Randy Kozel has put it, "Regardless of how future courts read
Windsor, they will still need to ask whether principles of federalism
and sovereignty justify a state's refusal to recognize same-sex mar-
riages despite the resulting harm to same-sex couples." 32
All of that said, even if courts conclude that some form of inter-
state recognition is constitutionally required, not all recognitions are
the same. One important distinction is between already-married
couples who move to a new state that does not recognize their mar-
riage (a "migratory" marriage) and couples who live in a state that
does not allow them to marry, but get married on a brief trip out-
side of that state (an "evasive" marriage). 33
30 See Randy J. Kozel, Holdings, Dicta, and the Paradigms of Precedent, 50-52 (Notre
Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 1443, 2013), available at http://ssm.com/abstract
=2312581 50-52 (making similar observation about Windsor).
31 See generally Chad Flanders, Toward a Theory of Persuasive Authority, 62 OKLA. L.
REv. 55 (2009) (explaining the concept of persuasive authority).
32 Kozel, supra note 30, at 51.
33 KOPPELMAN, supra note 8, at 100-13.
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There is a much stronger tradition of recognizing "migratory"
marriages than "evasive" ones.34 From a state's point of view, there
is a greater interest in regulating the conduct of people who are
domiciled there. At the time that a couple creates the marriage, it is
not yet too late to affect their behavior or change their mind. From
the couple's point of view, there is a greater claim of reliance if their
marriage was plainly lawful in their home state when they started
it. They may have made arrangements to entwine their lives with
no reason to believe that their marriage would later be questioned.
By contrast, a couple that must travel elsewhere to begin their mar-
riage should know that their marriage starts under a legal cloud.
The district court in Obergefell, however, extended a constitu-
tional requirement of recognition to a marriage at the far end of the
evasion spectrum. The couple in that case flew from Ohio to Mary-
land in a private jet, "whereupon Plaintiffs were married in the jet
as it sat on the tarmac in Anne Arundel County, Maryland. They
returned to Cincinnati that same day." 35 One member of the couple
was sufficiently ill that it appears that they did not even get out of
the airplane. The only way that the couple could have had more
fleeting contact with the territory of Maryland is if they had imitat-
ed the extreme limits of tag jurisdiction and gotten married as the
plane flew over Maryland, without landing.36
It is not clear that even a generous reading of Windsor should
extend so far. Unfortunately, the district judge in Obergefell did not
explain why he thought the evasiveness of the marriage was irrele-
m Id. at 12-19; Steve Sanders, The Constitutional Right to (Keep Your) Same-Sex Mar-
riage, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1421, 1433, 1479 (2012).
35 Obergefell v. Kasich, No. 13-501, 2013 WL 3814262 at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 3, 2013).
36 See Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (upholding personal
jurisdiction and service in Arkansas because defendant was flying over Arkansas
when he was served).
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vant. Indeed, the judge claimed (implausibly) "This is not a compli-
cated case." 3 7
Perhaps this points toward one possible way to give some
weight to both strands of Windsor: When a same-sex couple gets
married in their home state and then moves elsewhere, the new
state is constitutionally required to recognize their marriage. This
would be what Professor Steve Sanders has called a "right to keep
your same-sex marriage." 38 At the same time, when a couple lives in
a state that does not recognize same-sex marriage, they do not have
a constitutional right to force that state to recognize a marriage cel-
ebrated during a brief trip. Windsor did not recognize a right to
same-sex marriage, though of course the Court might do so in the
future.. Instead, it recognized a contingent right to have one's mar-
riage recognized. The right is contingent on an interested state hav-
ing dignified the relationship through positive law.
To be sure, this is not a perfect way to do justice to both parts of
Windsor, nor is it the only way. Rather, it is a compromise that is
consistent with traditional elements of choice of law. When a couple
tries to enter into an evasive marriage, it knows that there are seri-
ous questions about whether another state has the power to marry
them. The couple has also been warned by the Court that their
home state may have a special interest: Remember Windsor's re-
mark that "each state as a sovereign has a rightful and legitimate
concern in the marital status of persons domiciled within its bor-
ders"? 39 By allowing states to continue to make their own judgment
about evasive marriages, while perhaps requiring them to recognize
migratory marriages, courts would give weight to the dignity creat-
ed by a state's decision to marry a couple while also recognizing
37 Obergefell, 2013 WL 3814262 at* 1.
38 Sanders, supra note 34, at 1479.
39 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691 (quoting Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287,
298 (1942)).
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that other states, unlike the federal government, have a potentially
legitimate reason for disregarding the marriage.
Potentially legitimate, that is, unless and until the Court recog-
nizes a right to same-sex marriage.
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